

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BANGKO 03127 01 OF 02 111204Z

43

ACTION EA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05 CIAE-00

PM-03 DODE-00 A-01 SY-02 /037 W

----- 024783

R 111025Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8303

INFO CINCPAC POLAD

COMUSMACTHAI BANGKOK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BANGKOK 3127

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, TH

SUBJ: CONSULAR CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 29-30 FOCUSING ON  
THAILAND'S INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS

SUMMARY: THE QUARTERLY CONSULAR CONFERENCE FOCUSED  
ON THE INSURGENCY PROBLEM IN THAILAND AND COUNTER-  
INSURGENCY EFFORTS OF THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT.  
THE CONFERENCE NOTED THAT CONTRARY TO THE EXPECTATIONS  
OF SOME, THERE HAD BEEN NO DRAMATIC CHANGES IN THE  
THAI INSURGENCY OR IN THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF  
EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO THE INSURGENCY SINCE THE FALL  
OF VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA AND THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL  
TAKEOVER IN LAOS. COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITIES  
AND OPERATIONS OF THE RTG HAD ALSO NOT CHANGED A  
GREAT DEAL.

THERE WAS SOME INDICATION OF INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL RTG  
CONCERN OVER THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION BUT, THIS  
SO FAR, HAD NOT BEEN TRANSLATED INTO POLICY OR ACTION  
DIRECTED AGAINST THE INSURGENCY. RTG DEVELOPMENT  
ACTIVITIES IN TERMS OF GETTING AT BASIC ECONOMIC AND  
SOCIAL PROBLEMS WERE HAMPERED BY AN ARCHAIC BUREAUCRATIC  
SYSTEM. THE TAMBON COUNCIL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF THE KHUKRIT  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BANGKO 03127 01 OF 02 111204Z

GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN A QUALIFIED SUCCESS IN TERMS OF ITS OWN

OBJECTIVES, AND WELL RECEIVED BY THE PUBLIC, POSSIBLY BECAUSE IT LARGELY BY-PASSED THE BUREAUCRACY IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION. THE THAI INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM WAS EXTENSIVE BUT ILL-COORDINATED. THE BASIC PROBLEM WAS ONE OF LACK OF COMMUNICATION AMONG COMPETING BUREAUCRACIES. THERE WAS NO CONCENTRATION ON THE CPT AS A TARGET, AND NO COHERENT PLANS OR ACTIONS WERE DEVELOPED TO COUNTER CPT ACTIVITIES. END SUMMARY.

1. THE QUARTERLY CONSULAR CONFERENCE, HELD ON JANUARY 29 AND 30 IN BANGKOK, CONCENTRATED ON EXAMINING THE INSURGENCY PROBLEM IN THAILAND AND THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT (RTG) COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAM. THE FOLLOWING KEY POINTS EMERGED FROM DISCUSSION BY THE CONFEREES. (A MORE COMPLETE REPORT WILL FOLLOW BY AIRGRAM.)

2. MIDWAY IN THE FIRST DRY SEASON AFTER THE DRAMATIC CHANGES IN INDOCHINA, THERE HAS BEEN NO MAJOR CHANGE IN THE INTENSITY OF THE INSURGENCY OR IN THE QUNATITY AND QUALITY OF COMMUNIST EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO THE MOVEMENT. THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF INSURGENT-INITIATED INCIDENTS SINCE THIS DRY SEASON BEGAN, BUT AT A TEMPO NORMAL FOR THE DRY SEASON.

3. CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS DISCUSSED THE QUESTION, "WHY NO ACCELERATION OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT OF THE INSURGENCY?" THREE POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS WERE EXAMINED: A) HANOI IS PREOCCUPIED IN THE CONSOLIDATION PROCESS AND OTHER DOMESTIC CONCERNS AND CANNOT DEVOTE ITS FULL ATTENTION TO THE THAI SITUATION; B) COMMUNIST CHINA MIGHT BE PLAYING A USEFUL ROLE IN TERMS OF PUTTING A BRAKE ON EXTERNAL SUPPORT BECUASE OF IMPROVED AND INCREASING GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS; AND C) THE RELATIVELY SMALL SIZE OF THE INSURGENCY LIMITS THE AMOUNT OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT IT CAN ABSORB. NO DEFINITIVE CONCLUSIONS WERE ARRIVED AT ON THESE POINTS SINCE THERE IS LITTLE, IF ANY, HARD EVIDENCE AVAILABLE. IT WAS AGREED THAT CONTINUING RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION OF

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BANGKO 03127 01 OF 02 111204Z

THE QUESTION WOULD BE USEFUL, PARTICULARLY IF THE ANTICIPATED ACCELERATION OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT DOES NOT MATERIALIZE IN THE COMING MONTHS.

4. ADDITIONALLY, AN EXAMINATION WAS MADE OF POTENTIAL INTERNAL CPT PROBLEMS THAT COULD BE AFFECTING CPT PLANS AND OPERATIONS. SOME THAI OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN THEORIZING THAT A SPLIT HAS DEVELOPED WITHIN THE CPT WHICH HAS HINDERED THE PROGRESS

OF THE INSURGENCY. THE ASSUMED PARTY SPLIT WOULD INVOLVE NEWER ETHNIC-THAI CPT CADRE BECOMING MORE ORIENTED TOWARDS THE NORTH VEITNAM/USSR CAMP AS THE MORE DYNAMIC REVOLUTIONARY MODEL TO FOLLOW RATHER THAN PEKING, PRODUCING A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN OLD-LINE SINO-THAI CADRE AND THEIR THAI COLLEAGUES. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED THAT, ON THIS POINT AGAIN, THERE IS NO VISIBLE EVIDENCE OF A SPLIT IN CPT RANKS AT THIS TIME BUT CONTINUED MONITORING OF THE POSSIBILITY IS INDICATED.

5. THE INSURGENCY CONTINUES TO BE MAOIST-ORIENTED, FOLLOWING THE PATH OF PROTRACTED WARFARE AND "REVOLUTIONARY ARMED STRUGGLE" AS THE ONLY CORRECT ROAD TO STATE POWER. COMMUNIST PARTY OF THAILAND (CPT)- DIRECTED MILITARY AND POLITICAL OPERATIONS CONTINUE TO BE CONCENTRATED IN THE RURAL AREAS OF THE COUNTRY. CPT PROGRESS IN WIDENING ITS INFLUENCE AND CONTROL OVER THE RURAL POPULATION AND TERRITORY IS SLOW. THE INSURGENT BASE AREAS AND AREAS OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ARE STILL LARGELY CONFINED TO THE TRADITIONAL MOUNTAIN AREAS OF OPERATIONS AND THE OVERALL CPT INFRASTRUCTURE REMAINS MOUNTAIN-ORIENTED.

6. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN RTG COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICIES, PLANS AND ACTIONS. THE RTG CONTINUES TO HAVE THE CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES TO MOUNT MORE INTENSE CI EFFORTS, BUT DOES NOT DO SO. THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS OF INCREASED CONCERN OVER THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION DETERIORATING BUT, TO DATE, THIS HAS NOT BEEN TRANSLATED INTO EFFECTIVE POLICIES AND ACTIONS. THE THAI CI EFFORT APPEARS TO BE DIRECTED AT CONTAINING THE INSURGENCY WITHIN THE CONFINES OF INHOSPITABLE MOUNTAIN AREAS MAINLY ALONG THE THAI/LAOS BORDER, AND NOT AT ATTEMPTS TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BANGKO 03127 01 OF 02 111204Z

ELIMINATE THE PROBLEM. ROYAL THAI ARMY (RTA) TROOP DEPLOYMENTS ARE IN THE AREAS OF COMMUNIST TERRORIST (CT) BASES AND GUERRILLA ZONES AND SERVE TO INHIBIT COMMUNIST EXPANSION INTO LOWLAND ETHNIC THAI TERRITORIES. RTA EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST THE ARMED MAIN-FORCE CT UNITS REMAINS MARGINAL DUE TO A LACK OF BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP. THE KHUKRIT GOVERNMENT HAS NOT RAISED THE CI PRIORITY IN THE SCALE OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND IT HAS NOT ASSIGNED AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COORDINATED CI EFFORT TO AN EFFECTIVE COMMANDER OR ORGANIZATION. THE RESULT OF THIS CONTINUES TO BE A HALTING, FRAGMENTED HALF-HEARTED CI APPROACH BY ALL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES, HAVING CI RESPONSIBILITIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BANGKO 03127 02 OF 02 111217Z

43

ACTION EA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05 CIAE-00

PM-03 DODE-00 A-01 SY-02 /037 W

----- 025193

R 111025Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8304

INFO CINCPAC POLAD

COMUSMACTHAI BANGKOK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BANGKOK 3127

LIMDIS

7. THIS LESS-THAN-EFFECTIVE SUPPRESSION APPROACH MIGHT REPRESENT A DELIBERATE CHOICE ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT SINCE, ESTIMATION OF MANY SENIOR RTG OFFICIALS, VIGOROUS SUPPRESSION COULD ESCALATE THE FIGHTING AND MAKE THINGS WORSE. THAI OFFICIALS ALSO FEAR THAT ESCALATED MILITARY CONFRONTATION MIGHT PROVIDE THE EXCUSE FOR INJECTION OF PATHET LAO AND NORTH VIETNAMESE COMBAT TROOPS INTO CONTESTED AREAS ALONG THE NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN BORDERS. THE RTA CAN FIGHT THOUGH LACKING FORCEFUL SENIOR LEADERSHIP. IT HAS BEEN LEASHED BY NATIONAL POLICIES AND SENSITIVITIES THAT DICTATE THAT "THAIS SHOULD NOT KILL THAIS," AND BY A FEAR OF CREATING MORE CHARGES OF ATROCITIES, LEADING TO RENEWED CRITICISM BY STUDENTS AND OTHERS, OF RTA CI EFFORTS.

8. THE PROVINCIAL POLICE, WHO SHOULD PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN ATTACKING THE CPT INFRASTRUCTURE, ARE NEITHER MOTIVATED NOR TRAINED TO HANDLE THE TASK. WORSE, THIS MAJOR POLICE ELEMENT DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY CONTINUES TO ALIENATE PORTIONS OF THE POPULACE THROUGH ITS CORRUPT PRACTICES, FURTHER SOURING THE ALREADY NEGATIVE RURAL POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE RTG. IN MITIGATION, IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE PROVINCIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BANGKO 03127 02 OF 02 111217Z

POLICEMAN IS SO GROSSLY UNDERPAID THAT HE IS FORCED TO ENGAGE IN CORRUPTION IN ORDER TO SURVIVE. THE BORDER PATROL POLICE (BPP), WHILE TRAINED IN CI TECHNIQUES, ARE DEPLOYED IN UNDER-STRENGTH AND USUALLY UNDERARMED PLATOON AND COMPANY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS ALONG THAILAND'S BORDERS AND HAVE BECOME PRIME TARGETS FOR CT MASSED ATTACKS.

9. ON THE CIVILIAN SIDE, RTG EFFORTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT AREAS, IN THE CONTEXT OF GETTING AT THE BASIC ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CAUSES OF THE INSURGENCY, ARE DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE PROPERLY. THE TAMBON DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WAS EXAMINED IN DEPTH AND THE VERDICT WAS REACHED THAT THIS BASICALLY POLITICAL EFFORT WAS A QUALIFIED SUCCESS IN TERMS OF ITS OWN OBJECTIVES, WELL RECEIVED BY THE PUBLIC AND HAVING BOTH A POLITICAL AND (AT LEAST TEMPORARY) ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE RURAL AREAS. IT WAS ALSO FELT THAT WHATEVER SUCCESS THIS PROGRAM ACHIEVED WAS DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT BYPASSED MOST ELEMENTS OF THE RTG BUREAUCRACY. IT APPEARS THAT THE LINE CIVILIAN MINISTRIES ENGAGED IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS ARE CONTINUING THEIR BUSINESS-AS-USUAL APPROACHES TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY, AVOIDING ANY EXPLICIT TYING-IN OF THEIR PROGRAMS TO CONTERINSURGENCY. IT IS HOPED THAT SOCIAL PROGRESS DATA CAN BE OBTAINED TO SHED SOME LIGHT ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE REGULAR, ONGOING ACTIVITIES OF THE CIVILIAN MINISTRIES INTERSECT, OR DO NOT INTERSECT, WITH THE INSURGENCY PROBLEM.

10. THAI INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES WERE REVIEWED AND IT WAS FOUND THAT WHILE THERE ARE A HOST OF MILITARY, POLICE AND CIVILIAN AGENCIES COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE, THE BASIC ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES NECESSARY FOR COORDINATION, COLLATION AND DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE EITHER HAVE NOT BEEN SET UP OR, IF THEY ARE IN PLACE, ARE BEING IGNORED OR BY-PASSED. ALL INTELLIGENCE REPORTING IS DONE THROUGH INDIVIDUAL BUREAUCRATIC CHAINS OF COMMAND AND THERE IS NO SINGLE BODY WHICH COLLECTS, COLLATES AND DISSEMINATES INTELLIGENCE GATHERED FROM ALL OF THE COLLECTING AGENCIES. ISOC'S JOIN SECURITY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BANGKO 03127 02 OF 02 111217Z

CENTERS (JSCS) LOCATED IN EACH REGION OF THE COUNTRY ARE DESIGNED FOR THIS PURPOSE, BUT THEIR INTELLIGENCE

PRODUCTS ARE FAULTY AND INCOMPLETE BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF MILITARY, POLICE AND CIVILIAN COLLECTORS TO FORWARD TO THE JSCS ALL INFORMATION DEVELOPED.

11. WHILE THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IS BADLY ORGANIZED AND UNCOORDINATED, IT MANAGES TO WORK IN ITS OWN WAY. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) COMPOSED OF THE CHIEFS OF MOST OF THE COLLECTING AGENCIES, MANAGES TO OBTAIN SUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE TO KEEP IT ON TOP OF MOST SECURITY PROBLEMS. A SIGNIFICANT WEAKNESS THAT THE NSC FACES IS LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTERNAL WORKINGS OF THE CPT, ITS INTERNAL STRUCTURE, DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES AND PLANS AND INTENTIONS. THERE IS NO FOCUS ON THE PART OF RTG INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS ON THE BASIC STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE CPT AND NO EFFORT MADE TO PLAN AND IMPLEMENT COUNTEREFFORTS AGAINST CPT ACTIVITIES.

WHITEHOUSE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** POLITICAL STABILITY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, POLICIES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 11 FEB 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** vogelfj  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976BANGKO03127  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D760051-0860  
**From:** BANGKOK  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19760261/aaaacbmj.tel  
**Line Count:** 295  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 6  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** vogelfj  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 21 MAY 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <21 MAY 2004 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <16 SEP 2004 by vogelfj>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** CONSULAR CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 29-30 FOCUSING ON THAILAND'S INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS  
**TAGS:** PINS, TH  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006